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A Close Look at the Operational Level of War at Sea
Captain Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired)
oday’s American navy writes prolifically about maritime strategies but has 
not devoted equal attention to campaign plans or analysis that tests the strat-
egies’ viability. We illustrate herein how the operational—or campaign—level 
links policy and strategy to the tactical and technological elements of war at sea. 
First, we relate how the U.S. Navy reluctantly came to accept the existence of an 
operational level of warfare but having done so will find it useful. Second, we de-
scribe important properties of naval operations in terms of constants, trends, and 
variables in warfare at and from the sea. Third, we demonstrate how operational-
level planning would help if the Navy and the nation were to adopt six clearly 
stated, twenty-first-century strategies that would serve present and future na-
tional policies better than do current strategy documents. 
VIEWS OF NAVIES REGARDING THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF WAR
In both peace and war, we frequently carry out our roles through 
campaigns [that] focus on the operational level of war. . . . There are 
three levels: tactical, operational, and strategic. . . . The operational level 
concerns forces collectively in a theater.
GENERAL C. E. MUNDY AND ADMIRAL F. B. KELSO
The Operational Level of War at Sea Introduced and Described
The U.S. Navy first acknowledged the existence of an operational level of war 
at sea when Admiral Kelso, as Chief of Naval Operations, and General Mundy, 
Commandant of the Marine Corps, signed the first “naval doctrine publication,” 
entitled Naval Warfare, in the spring of 1994.1 In part the change had come from 
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pressure for common terminology after World War II. In part it had come at the 
urging of the Marine Corps, which saw the advantage of applying “operational 
art,” standing between strategy and tactics. The second edition of Naval Warfare, 
issued in 2010, reaffirms the three levels of war and concentrates specifically on 
the operational level as its doctrinal domain.2
The three elements of war, in the Navy’s eyes, had previously been strategy, 
tactics, and logistics. Part of the reason that logistics were prominent was the geo-
graphical span of naval operations. Distances scarcely imagined by ground force 
commanders are involved at sea; a map of a maritime theater generally covers a 
geographical area an order of magnitude larger than that for a ground campaign. 
The activities of a naval campaign (or operation) are probably at least 80 percent 
the processes of operational logistics. Therefore it is reasonable—and clarify-
ing—to say that the American navy’s three levels of war at sea have now become 
strategy, operational logistics (or merely operations), and tactics. In what follows, 
we apply this utilitarian perspective of three levels of war to describe naval opera-
tions. We make no reference to operational art in past U.S., German, or Soviet 
army applications for ground operations. Nor do we have space to describe how 
naval operations are linked to joint operations. We are consistent, however, with 
the quite adequate descriptions of joint operations in Naval Warfare (NDP-1).3
The Traditional View of Navies
Sir Julian Corbett and American admirals Bradley Fiske and J. C. Wylie, among 
others, thought strategy included the operations in a naval campaign. This view-
point permeates Corbett’s Some Principles of Maritime Strategy.4 Fiske’s The Navy 
as a Fighting Machine describes his vision of a fleet this way: “Imagine now a 
strategical system . . . so that the navy will resemble a vast and efficient organism, 
all the parts leagued together by a common understanding and a common pur-
pose; mutually dependent, mutually assisting, sympathetically obedient to the 
controlling mind that directs them toward the ‘end in view.’”5 Wylie is the most 
explicit. He points out that in most of history naval theorists have said that tactics 
apply when the opposing forces are in contact. Then, “the plans and operations 
are ‘tactical.’ Everything outside of contact is ‘strategic.’”6
Among non-American examples there are no better illustrations than Italian 
admiral Romeo Bernotti’s two fine books on tactics and strategy written in the 
first decade of the twentieth century. While still a lieutenant and instructor in 
the art of naval war at the Royal Italian Naval Academy, Bernotti wrote his highly 
respected Fundamentals of Naval Tactics. In 1911 followed Fondamenti di strategia 
navale (Fundamentals of Naval Strategy). The latter has never been published in 
English, but both books apply quantitative analysis so effectively that Bernotti’s 
biographer, Brian Sullivan, says they foreshadowed operations analysis that we 
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usually date from World War II. Bernotti’s untranslated book on strategy is al-
most entirely devoted to naval operations—that is, campaign planning and execu-
tion. The text is replete with geometric and mathematical guides for operational 
activities that include “strategic” reconnaissance and search procedures, along 
with the distinction between strategic and tactical scouting methods; strategic 
mobility, cruising speeds, and combat radii; and logistical activities, accompanied 
by a quantitative comparison between serial replenishment at sea and support 
from nearby bases. 
In the years prior to World War II, most professional studies at the U.S. Naval 
War College, in Newport, Rhode Island, emphasized either tactics (and tech-
nology) or operations (and logistics). The war games played there—over three 
hundred of them between 1919 and 1940—were intended either to execute a 
presumed strategy in a campaign or to teach and test battle tactics. These games 
revealed early on that the strategy then intended to guide the campaign in the 
Pacific was unexecutable. They correctly showed that a strategy of rapid relief 
of the Philippines (under Japanese attack, of course) would take too long. Over 
twenty years a change to a more realistic Pacific strategy took place, slowly but 
relentlessly. There was no wishing-will-make-it-so in Naval War College strategic 
thinking, because execution was tested for feasibility by strategic (i.e., opera-
tional) games.7 The operational level, tested in “battles” at the tactical level, had 
evaluated the intended strategy and found it wanting.
The U.S. Navy’s skills at operational planning and methods for conducting 
campaign analyses have greatly expanded since the days when Naval War College 
gaming was so central. Analytical successes achieved during the Cold War were 
valuable in refining plans for nuclear deterrence and protecting the sea-lanes to 
Europe.8 
Kinds of Naval Operations
A categorization broadly applicable to most states is that navies perform one or 
more of four tasks. Every navy’s composition will be, or ought to be, constructed 
on the basis of its intended contribution to the following functions:
On the seas . . . 
1. Ensure safety of goods and services: navies protect the movement of 
shipping and means of war on the oceans and safeguard stationary forces, 
to include nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs) and 
coastal patrols.
2. Deny safety of enemy goods and services: navies prevent the movement 
of enemy shipping and means of war and threaten enemy forces, such as 
SSBNs.
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From the seas . . .
3. Deliver goods and services: navies put land forces ashore to seize and 
hold territory and deliver air and missile strikes for a variety of purposes. 
(Recently our own navy has added delivery of disaster assistance as an 
explicit “core competency.”)
4. Prevent enemy delivery of goods and services: navies protect the 
homeland from threats coming by sea.
American Naval Operations
Before examining operations in the contemporary scene, it is useful to review 
the traditional views of sea power, because the U.S. Navy is now emerging from 
an anomalous period, one that began in 1945, in which it performed two func-
tions only. The first was defending the sea lines of communication that linked 
members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on both sides of 
the Atlantic. The second was projecting power from sea to land in many places. 
The first function was never put to the test. The second was performed without 
loss and almost flawlessly in support of a great many land operations overseas. 
The oceans are very large, two-dimensional highways for commercial ship-
ping. Whoever controls the seas has a great advantage, the loss of which leads 
to dire consequences. There is incontestable historical evidence that sea powers 
usually defeat land powers. See any of A. T. Mahan’s works, commencing with The 
Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783—they show the sweeping effect 
of command of the seas in history, from Greek and Roman times through the 
Napoleonic Wars. A more recent book to this point is John Arquilla’s landmark 
Dubious Battles. Arquilla quantifies an even bolder assertion, that in wars since 
1815 not only have sea powers usually defeated land powers but land powers 
more often than not initiated the wars that they then lost.9
Both Mahan and Arquilla offer rich explanations of the strategic reasons why. 
For example, a land power usually must maintain a substantial army. Only the 
most prosperous of land powers can simultaneously field an army and deploy a 
navy—as, for example, when France, the great land power of the eighteenth cen-
tury, was confronted at sea by Britain’s Royal Navy. Neither Mahan nor Arquilla, 
however, explains the operational advantages that a sea power exploits over a 
land power. We will explain the advantages explicitly, under two great constants: 
operational maneuver and efficiency of movement. 
The Traditional Composition of a Fleet
In the past, naval operations have been carried out by four categories of naval 
forces. The first three are described best by Julian Corbett, the preeminent naval 
writer of a century ago. 
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A battle fleet, capital ships and accompanying forces, meets and destroys the 
enemy’s battle fleet. Mahan said, correctly, that the purpose of a battle fleet is to 
destroy the enemy’s fleet in order to achieve command of the sea. But a battle 
fleet was usually ill suited to perform other roles. Corbett famously identified two 
other kinds of forces as well.
The first of these (and the second category of forces) comprised cruisers, 
which attack enemy commerce or defend our own from attack. Capital ships of 
the battle fleet have been inefficient at or incapable of defending “trade,” even 
after establishing unchallenged 
command of the seas. Raiders, 
pirates, and privateers were his-
torically the threat. Since World 
War I surface raiders have been 
replaced by submarines and also, 
since World War II, by long-range, shore-based aircraft or missiles. A state that 
could not challenge a big navy for sea control could resort to guerre de course, a 
guerrilla war at sea, threatening commerce and denying to the sea power risk-free 
operations. Hence, defensive “cruisers” represented a necessary navy component, 
sufficient in numbers, speed, and radius of action to defeat cruiser-raiders. Sub-
marines that supplanted surface raiders had to be opposed by large numbers of 
antisubmarine forces, which are also “cruisers” in Corbett’s terminology. Mine 
warfare is another form of cruiser warfare.
Corbett also pointed to flotillas that operate in littoral waters too dangerous 
for capital ships. A flotilla consists of small combatants with short radii of action 
but considerable firepower. It survives less by armor or defensive firepower than 
by numbers of units and stealthiness, exploiting the coastal “terrain” and attack-
ing in coordinated operations that we now call “swarms.”
The emphasis of Mahan and Corbett is on control of the oceans—Functions 1, 
2, and, indirectly, 4. To serve Function 3, the amphibious force, a fourth category 
of fighting fleet, was introduced and developed by the Navy and Marine Corps for 
World War II, when it comprised assault transports, tank landing ships, medium 
landing craft, and the like. But Function 3, the delivery of goods and services from 
the sea, is much broader than an amphibious force’s opposed-assault capability. 
Since the last opposed landing, at Inchon in 1950, the nation has enjoyed near-
flawless success in safe, unopposed delivery of ground and air forces from the sea. 
Books by P. H. Colomb and Frank Uhlig make clear that this category of operations
—power projection for land operations—is what dominant navies have been 
concerned with most of the time.10 Throughout history, influencing events on 
land has been a function sometimes as important and performed as frequently 
as safeguarding the sea-lanes. And why not? “The seat of purpose is on the land” 
The war games played [at the Naval War Col-
lege between 1919 and 1940] revealed early 
on that the strategy then intended to guide the 
campaign in the Pacific was unexecutable.
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has been and remains a cornerstone for every navy, a tenet to remember even 
when a contest for command of the sea temporarily dominates its operations.11
It is clarifying to distinguish the amphibious assault ships intended for forcible 
entry by marines from the many more and different kinds of ships for the am-
phibious lift that delivers and sustains army, marine, special forces, and air forces 
overseas. Mahan and other writers of his era emphasized that sea power included 
a merchant fleet. This was in part because when he wrote a commercial fleet was 
the means of delivering armies overseas.
An Incongruity and Its Significance for the Twenty-First Century
Observe there is no evident congruence between the four functions and four 
traditional force types—that is to say, between the ends and means of naval op-
erations. A nation’s operating forces are its means of achieving its maritime (or 
national) strategy’s ends. Though the functions will abide, there is no inherent 
reason why the force categories of the past must hold in the future. The U.S. Navy 
may wish to examine whether the paradigm of a battle fleet of capital ships physi-
cally concentrated to achieve decisive battle is obsolete. It would be highly useful 
to explore whether Functions 1 and 2—safeguarding the movement of ships at 
sea and denying safe movement to the enemy—can be achieved without capital 
ships, such as ships of the line, battleships, or aircraft carriers. No one knows with 
certainty, because the U.S. Navy’s command of the seas has not been recently 
challenged. Even the formidable Soviet navy concerned itself mainly with sea 
denial, rarely with sea control. Later we will suggest that a more distributable and 
survivable navy for the twenty-first century might do triple duty as battle fleet, 
cruisers, and—at least in part—flotilla. Such a fleet cannot serve, however, for 
efficient projection of sea power to the land. 
To pursue the several relationships would constitute a study in itself. It is a 
subject we have no space to consider in detail, but it is pertinent that the nature 
of future ships, aircraft, and sensors in a missile-age navy derives as much from 
operational as from tactical considerations.
OPERATIONAL CONSTANTS, TRENDS, AND VARIABLES
Understanding the processes of combat is a better approach to tactics 
[than principles are]. Processes are the navigator’s science and art; prin-
ciples are the stars he uses to find his way. . . . The key to fruitful study . . .
is an appreciation of how battles transpire in time and space.
WAYNE P. HUGHES, JR.
The principles of war—and from Sun Tzu until now there have been at least 
twenty-two sets of them—must by definition apply to war at sea, but because 
they are general and abstract they inherently have limited practical value.12 
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Operational constants—things that abide—are more utilitarian, because they 
can be deduced from the history of naval operations. Trends—things that change 
from age to age in one direction—are likewise deduced from history, are usually 
brought about by new technology, and apply as much at the operational level as 
the tactical level at sea.13 The sinking of the Israeli destroyer Eilat by small Egyp-
tian missile boats on 21 October 1967 was an abrupt indicator of the lethality of 
small missile ships and their power to take out more than their weight of enemy 
warships at sea.14 The fatal attack foretold a swift change, an abrupt transforma-
tion of naval combat. The significance was grasped at once by the Israeli navy, 
which ordered small Sa’ar combatants armed with Gabriel missiles and employed 
them nearly flawlessly in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. 
There is a third category we shall call variables. Variables at the operational 
level of war stem not from technology but from social and political change. 
Variables are not a trend in one direction but change according to geopolitical 
circumstances. The present interest in irregular warfare and resistance to terrorist 
attacks, such as the one on USS Cole (DDG 67) at Aden, brought about a great 
change of emphasis in the world’s navies (and armies), but throughout history 
there have been many examples of sneak attacks in ports or restricted waters. 
The well named “Long War of the Twenty-First Century” appears to have dura-
bility, but any historian will say that what is wrought by societies and geopolitics 
will change in direction. The rise of China and its well documented interest in 
sea power is one such impending change, one that ought to temper any single-
minded U.S. Navy emphasis on projection of power and, relatedly, humanitarian 
operations.
No catalog of constants, trends, and variables in naval operations has been 
compiled as has been done at the tactical level, but it is useful to offer salient 
examples of each.15 
Two Great Constants: Operational Maneuver and Efficiency of Movement
“Operational maneuver from the sea” is a modern term coined by the U.S. Marine 
Corps, but the efficacy of expeditionary operations and the efficient support of 
land forces operating across oceans have been and remain constant advantages 
of maritime superiority. Twenty-five years ago, in the heyday of the NATO alli-
ance, a thoughtful German army officer named Otto Bubke wrote a short essay 
describing the operational reasons why command of the sea is so advantageous.16 
On one hand, he argued, sea control prevents an enemy from attacking from the 
sea. On the other, it gives a maritime state the power to choose its scene of ac-
tion, somewhere on a land power’s coast.17 The reason for the latter, he stressed, 
was the operational-movement advantage of ships over ground transportation. 
At sea an amphibious force moves around five hundred nautical miles a day. Fast 
containerships move farther still, though in the twentieth century the norm for 
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merchant ships was more like four hundred. On land an army moving at opera-
tional speed against weak opposition advances about twenty-five statute miles 
a day. The famous German blitzkriegs in Poland and France in 1939 and 1940 
moved no faster than that. The ancient Roman road system was designed to allow 
a legion to move thirty miles a day.18 In 1066, King Harold of England had to rush 
north to defeat a Norwegian attack near York and then immediately back south 
to face William of Normandy at Hastings (where William would earn the epithet 
“the Conqueror”). Harold’s army 
averaged thirty miles a day during 
the round-trip. In DESERT STORM, 
the American army’s famous “left 
hook” crossed Kuwait to reach the 
Iraq border eighty miles away in four days, thus moving at twenty miles a day. A 
decade later, in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, American ground forces advancing 
against light to moderate opposition took twenty-one days to reach Baghdad, 
which was 250 miles from the Kuwait border—a rate of advance of twelve miles 
per day.
Thus, in speed of operational movement ships have more than an order-of-
magnitude advantage over armies advancing against no or light resistance. They 
always have and likely always will. The number of logistical personnel required to 
move a force to the scene of action and sustain it there is probably two orders of 
magnitude less for ships than for land transport. In weight of combat potential 
carried per unit of energy expended, the advantage of ships may be as much as 
three orders of magnitude. The introduction of aircraft and aerial logistics com-
plicates this simplified description, but aircraft have never changed the threefold 
advantage of ships over ground transportation sufficiently to offset a sea power’s 
operational advantage. Ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads potentially at-
tenuate a sea power’s advantage if they are used intercontinentally, but to date 
they have not significantly altered the advantage of naval operations in speed or 
efficiency of movement.19
Otto Bubke did not say, nor do we, that the sea power’s advantage is the power 
to attack a strong land power’s physical center of gravity, because the land power 
will know what that vital spot is and defend it. Nor does the sea power’s advan-
tage always allow it to strike quickly and decisively; Great Britain found out that it 
could not land on German soil in World War I, and even an alternative operation 
against the Dardanelles proved too ambitious. In World War II the Normandy 
landings had to be deferred until 1944. But Bubke shows with rare clarity that 
because a sea power cannot be invaded, it does not have to maintain a large stand-
ing army, and it can often find and fund allies for coalition operations against the 
dominant land power that threatens them all.
Though the functions of force will abide, there 
is no inherent reason why the force categories 
of the past must hold in the future.
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Another Constant: Two Different Campaign Processes
J. C. Wylie was the first to distinguish two different “strategies,” or ways of con-
ducting a campaign. One is “sequential,” in which each operational success is 
another step toward victory, and a battle won becomes the foundation of the 
next. The classic example is the sweep of the Fifth and Third Fleets across the 
Central Pacific in amphibious assaults from the Gilbert Islands to the Philippines 
in less than a year. Mahan spoke of achieving one decisive battle, but in the last 
two centuries two or more “decisive” battles have been necessary to achieve com-
mand of the sea. 
The other way of conducting a campaign described by Wylie is through the 
“cumulative” results of many small actions. The world wars’ submarine cam-
paigns in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Mediterranean are representative, and all 
guerres de course are antecedents. Those who do not find the distinction self-
evident will find a thorough discussion in Wylie’s classic Military Strategy.20 Wylie 
also points out the advantage of pursuing both operational modes in concert.
Sequential and cumulative campaigns were common in the age of fighting sail, 
the battleship era, and aircraft-carrier era. Although there have been no big sea 
battles in the missile age, this operational constant continues to hold. A sequence 
of short, sharp missile battles occurred in the eastern Mediterranean in the 1973 
Arab-Israeli War, and it deserves careful study. A sequential campaign on the 
open ocean in the missile age was waged by the British navy in the Falklands War. 
It started at sea and ended on land. A superb introduction to it is by its opera-
tional commander, Admiral Sandy Woodward, Royal Navy. His felicitous mem-
oir, One Hundred Days, is the best and very nearly the only personal description 
of the burdens of modern command at sea—long-range aircraft, short-range 
Exocet missiles, and a submarine put unremitting pressure on him at the opera-
tional level, and sometimes the tactical level as well.21 
A long cumulative maritime campaign that transpired during most of the 
1980s (actually, a pair of identical and opposing ones) was conducted by Iraq and 
Iran against shipping in the Persian Gulf. It included many—over a hundred—
missile attacks.
One More Constant: The Importance of Espionage for Operational Effectiveness
We will examine below as a great trend the improvements in operational recon-
naissance and surveillance. There can be little doubt, however, that clandestine 
information gathering—espionage—with a similar goal has affected states and 
naval operations for a very long time. A prominent tool of espionage has been 
code breaking, illustrated by MAGIC’s effect in determining Japanese operational 
intentions. In the Battle of the Atlantic, ULTRA on the Allied side—though offset 
at times by code breaking on the German side—created big swings in the loss 
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rates of Allied shipping and German U-boats. In the Cold War, U-2 and SR-71 
flights were prominent in “strategic” (i.e., operational) early warning. The impor-
tant observation for our purposes is that the value of espionage is not tactical but 
operational. It may bring about battles—for example, the battle of Jutland and 
other North Sea engagements in World War I—but it rarely affects battle tactics 
or outcomes.
A Great Trend: Changes to Scouting Effectiveness
The scouting process enjoys a trend, stemming from advances in technology, to 
greater detection range and accuracy. “Scouting” is the gathering and delivery of 
information; that once-popular term is more compact than “intelligence, surveil-
lance, and reconnaissance” (even though often abbreviated as “ISR”). Through-
out most of naval history operational scouting was difficult for fleets. When a 
blockaded fleet escaped to sea, the blockading fleet was hard put to regain con-
tact. After the French fleet escaped Admiral Horatio Nelson’s blockade of Toulon 
and other French ports in 1798, he spent weeks sailing all over the Mediterranean 
trying to track it down before he finally found and destroyed it in the battle of 
the Nile.22 Until the first decades of the twentieth century, privateers, raiders, 
and pirates preyed on shipping without untoward risk. A great transformation 
occurred between 1910 and 1920 with the introduction of aerial reconnaissance 
for wide-area search, accompanied by instant wireless-radio reporting.23 Within 
a decade surface raiders became obsolete, and guerre de course at sea, to be suc-
cessful, had to be conducted by submarines, which could to a much greater extent 
remain undetected by aircraft. Locating an enemy fleet and even individual sur-
face raiders became much less of a guessing game. Aerial scouting at sea changed 
the nature of naval operations irrevocably. 
And the trend continues, with satellites, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), 
and other means to enhance surveillance at sea. Electronic intercept exacerbates 
the vulnerability of radiating warships to detection. Processing the information 
has now become a greater challenge than collecting it. Thus the current trend 
is a shift of emphasis from the means of scouting—to collect comprehensive 
data—to the fusion and interpretation of massive amounts of information into 
an essence on which commanders may decide and act.
Tactical and operational scouting overlap to no small extent—in fact so much 
so that they can be distinguished only by their effects. A UAV may be in the air 
for surveillance and operational warning of an approaching threat, or it may 
serve the tactical purpose of guiding weapons to the target. The initial efficacious 
campaign against the Taliban in Afghanistan is a good illustration of operational 
and tactical scouting conducted with the same aircraft. 
The watchword of operational scouting is comprehensiveness. The watchword 
of tactical scouting is timeliness.
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Three More Trends
Increasing Range of Land-to-Sea Threats. Increasingly the sea is subject to attack 
and even domination from the land. At first land-based aircraft were not very 
effective unless their crews were specifically trained to navigate and hit moving 
targets afloat. For the past thirty or forty years vulnerability to land attack has 
grown because of the tactical-operational trend toward increasing range and ac-
curacy of scouting systems (or ISR), accompanied by the increasing range and 
accuracy of guided missiles, both ballistic and cruise. Today’s defender is increas-
ingly hard put to deal with either kind of antiship missile, let alone both. This 
leads to the possibility of a coastal no-man’s-land where neither shipping can 
flow nor surface warships can operate until command of the sea, including air 
superiority over the adjacent land, has been established. The trend restores em-
phasis on Function 1 (secure seas), which in large measure was taken for granted 
in the U.S. Navy after 1990, when Function 3 (projecting power) was the sole 
focus of attention.
Increased Port Vulnerability. Strikes into ports and airfields ashore have, over the 
past seventy years, virtually eliminated the “fleet in being,” held safely in reserve. 
Starting with the British strikes on Italian battleships in Taranto in 1940, the 
hazard to ships in port has grown. A recent example is the use of missiles in two 
Indian attacks on Pakistani ships in Karachi in 1971. In the realm of irregular 
warfare, the terrorist attack on Cole in port at Aden and U.S. Navy efforts to pre-
vent recurrences point to an important change of operational perspective that 
applies even in “peacetime.”
Growth of Claims to Ocean Ownership. In the past “ownership” was a ques-
tion largely restricted to land war. Today the question of ocean dominion—
accompanied by increasing claims of ocean sovereignty—is a visible trend that 
will continue. Fishing rights have long been contentious, but now seabed min-
eral resources have led to expanding international claims and counterclaims that 
threaten to curtail freedom of transit on the high seas or to lead to conflict at sea.
A Variable: Changed Operational Plans Due to Social and Political Developments
The current emphasis on irregular warfare is a change that is not a trend. It does 
not stem from scientific progress; its cause is human, not technological. Non-
state terrorist attacks and other criminal activity, such as smuggling, have led the 
world’s armed forces to act against a threat different from those the U.S. Navy 
prepared to oppose in the twentieth century. The problem’s maritime aspect is 
represented by piracy, stolen cargoes (for example, Nigerian petroleum), and 
terrorist threats to shipping. Maritime forces contend with drug running and il-
legal immigration, including “boat people” fleeing unstable societies. At present, 
however, our navy’s most frequent role is to deliver and sustain forces contending 
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on land in irregular warfare for purposes of stability, security, and reconstruc-
tion. Meanwhile, the foremost role of a great sea power—presently the United 
States—presumably is still the security of all nations’ shipping on the high seas. 
Navies have conducted small wars to suppress rebellion, piracy, and slave 
trading many times in the past. But it is prudent to anticipate that fleet actions 
will occur again in the future, because China must and will go to sea to achieve 
great-power status.
Part Variable, Part Trend: Fewer Battles at Sea
Sea battles for maritime supremacy in Greek and Roman times were much more 
prevalent than today. This was also true in the Mediterranean in the fifteenth 
and sixteenth centuries, when Ottoman Turks and the leading powers of Europe
—Spain, France, and the Holy Roman Empire—contended with each other in 
prolonged and bitter operations on land and sea. In the seventeenth century, the 
Dutch and English fought repeated wars almost completely restricted to the seas. 
The phenomenon was tied to technology: at the time, a new fighting fleet could 
be built in just a few years. A wealthy state’s defeated navy could be back in action 
soon after having suffered a crushing and “decisive” defeat.
The nineteenth century was a transition, one in which the ships became big-
ger, more expensive, and more heavily armed. It became harder for a defeated 
state to replace its losses or construct a new navy. In the early twentieth century 
the trend of fewer battles continued throughout the battleship era. This led to a 
startling phenomenon. From 1890 to 1910 no fewer than seventy-four classes of 
pre-Dreadnought battleships were built. Yet during the entire battleship era only 
seven decisive battles for command of the sea occurred.24 
But the variables of statecraft too are responsible for fewer battles and less con-
flict on the high seas. In part the trend may be traced to the dominance of Great 
Britain and its policy of enlightened self-interest during the Pax Britannica, dur-
ing which the Royal Navy protected the shipping of all friendly nations. A period 
nearly free of sea battles lasted from 1815 to early in the twentieth century. The 
infrequency of fleet actions explains to a large extent why capital-ship designs in 
the battleship era were so numerous, so experimental, and sometimes so foolish. 
The stability of the Pax Britannica was finally destroyed before World War I by 
the rise of Germany and its High Seas Fleet, along with the navies of many other 
states who felt compelled to compete. The existence of many fleets continued 
through World War II and generated many naval operations and battles. After 
World War II, American naval dominance created a new era of stability and an 
absence of decisive fleet actions—although there was no lack of naval operations, 
as the ascending U.S. Navy and other, declining navies projected their power 
overseas.
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Thus the infrequency of naval battles is due in part to technology that 
spawned bigger and more expensive warships, aircraft, satellites, and command-
and-control systems. In part it is the product of a nontechnical, social phenom-
enon in which states have been content to let one dominant sea power protect 
their sea-lanes. But that is changing. There has been reluctance in other states to 
rely on big, expensive American warships to protect against piracy, for example. 
As the societal variables wax and wane, we should also anticipate a resurgence of 
confrontations at sea that will accompany the rise of a peer competitor against a 
dominant sea power, which, of course, are currently the Chinese People’s Libera-
tion Army Navy and the American navy, respectively.
THE PROCESSES OF OPERATIONAL COMMAND THAT GOVERN A 
CAMPAIGN
A fairly careful scrutiny of the opponent’s thought patterns and their un-
derlying assumptions should be an early component of our own planning 
process. . . . An examination of this type might uncover something crucial 
in reaching toward establishment of control.
J. C. WYLIE
Clear Decisions and Integrated Actions 
In theory, strategists determine the desirable aims in a theater of operations, spe-
cifically where and when to act and why.25 They also normally decide the forces 
to commit to the campaign. The tactical commander determines how to confront 
and fight the enemy at the scene of action by transforming the combat potential 
of forces into combat power. Lying between strategic intent and tactical fulfill-
ment, the operational commanders’ role is to assure for themselves sea control for 
safe transit and delivery of the forces carrying combat potential to the strategists’ 
scene of action and to sustain them for the duration of the campaign. What we 
take from Wylie is that we cannot determine how best to control an enemy until 
we know the opponent sufficiently to get inside his mind and methods. Abstract 
enemies at unspecified locations will not take us far in concrete planning.
In practice, the three levels are an overlapping web of responsibilities and 
authority. Before a campaign is initiated, some combination of strategic and 
operational thinking estimates the combat potential needed to achieve the objec-
tive against the expected opposition, then calculates whether that quantity can 
be delivered and sustained. It is a responsibility of the operational commander 
to tell the strategist realistically how fast the forces containing the requisite com-
bat potential can be brought to the scene of action. Of course, the strategist has 
a staff to make these estimates, but the staff does not have to perform the acts 
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of delivery and sustainment, and the operational commander’s staff usually has 
better local knowledge of the temper and talents of the opposition. Tactical com-
manders will also make their own estimates about sufficiency and will have their 
own opinions about the enemy as they construct battle plans to create combat 
power and employ it.
Seamless Planning and Execution
One is struck by the seamlessness of the discussions of war on and from the sea in 
the writings of the best authors. They also emphasize the difference between op-
erations and tactics at sea and those on land. The closer one looks, the more one 
detects overlap between the policy-strategy, operational-logistical, and tactical-
technological elements in the successful conduct of war at sea. That does not 
obviate the advantage of artificially distinguishing separate purposes for strategy, 
operations, and tactics, as long as the officer corps does not become pedantic 
about isolating responsibilities in different decision-making bins. 
Let us look at two familiar, critical junctures in the Pacific War through a new 
lens to show the separate but interwoven characteristics of strategy, operations, 
and tactics. Both examples are taken from 1942, when Japanese and American 
forces were evenly matched in quantity, quality, and tactical prowess.
Illustration of Actions by Defenders
Through the spring of 1942, the United States was on the defensive in the Pacific 
while the Imperial Japanese Navy conducted a swift, successful campaign of con-
quest in French Indochina, the British Malay States, and the Dutch East Indies, 
while concurrently establishing a maritime perimeter to protect its resource base 
in Southeast Asia.26 Through the battle of Midway, the Japanese navy decided 
where and when to act. Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet—the operational 
commander, Admiral C. W. Nimitz—had the role of marshaling our defenses. 
The strategist, Admiral E. J. King in Washington, had plenty to say, but the formal 
role he pursued, and vigorously, was to send reinforcements, from the Atlantic 
and from new construction, to the theater as rapidly as possible. 
A curious thing about the battle for Midway Island is the dual role played by 
Nimitz before the battle. A close reading of his decisions shows that he was at the 
outset his own tactical commander. He positioned the carrier task forces of R. A. 
Spruance and F. J. Fletcher and assigned their aircraft carriers specific and differ-
ent tactical roles; he directed all the long-range reconnaissance; and he ordered 
the air attacks from Midway Island. These were not operational decisions; they 
were tactical decisions and crucial to our success. Only Nimitz at Pearl Harbor 
had the power to control long-range air search and activate the initial air attacks 
from Midway, which were ineffective but valuable in that they distracted Admiral 
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Chuichi Nagumo. Nimitz did not and could not let go of the tactical reins until 
the task forces’ three lurking, undetected carriers, constrained by radio silence, 
had themselves detected the Japanese Striking Force’s four carriers. When it was 
possible for Fletcher to assume tactical command, Nimitz backed off. Then when 
Fletcher’s command suite was crippled, he did not hesitate to pass the conn, 
seamlessly, to Spruance.27
Illustration of Actions by Attackers
The campaign for Guadalcanal was the first time the United States exercised sig-
nificant strategic choice in the Pacific. The extended campaign for Guadalcanal 
and the larger Solomon Islands campaign are splendid examples of the interre-
lated roles of strategy, operational 
(or logistical) support, and tactics, 
in all of which sea, air, and ground 
forces all collaborated. 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff, urged 
on by Admiral King, decided after the battle of Midway that the geographical 
area around the Solomon Islands in the southwest Pacific was of supreme impor-
tance and a suitable location for a fighting defense, known later as the offensive-
defensive phase of the Pacific War. Because the Japanese, though licking their 
wounds suffered at Midway, were also constructing an airfield on Guadalcanal 
from which to dominate the surrounding airspace, King wished to block their 
advance by a swift assault to seize the airfield before it became operational. Time 
was critical, so the landing was specified for early August 1942. 
Admiral Nimitz, the theater commander, had to decide whether the forces 
envisioned would be adequate. There were ample ground forces in the Pacific but 
enough transport to deliver and sustain only one Marine division as far away as 
the Solomons. It would be the task of the tactical commanders, notably Admirals 
Fletcher and R. K. Turner and Marine general A. A. Vandegrift, to land the 1st 
Marine Division, establish a perimeter on Guadalcanal, and activate the airfield 
(to be known as Henderson Field). Much of the Pacific Fleet would be committed 
to support the landing and block a Japanese response. 
Thereupon came about a bitter six-month-long campaign for Henderson 
Field—a reaction from the Japanese navy had been predicted but not its vigor. 
Historians have covered the campaign in detail but have not said enough about 
the initial operational constraint on the American side, the lack of transport. 
On the Japanese side the failure lay in an initially piecemeal, if swift, response, 
sending too little too late to push the Marines into the sea. This was in part 
due to mismatch at the strategic level between the importance of the end and 
willingness to send tactical commanders the means to destroy the American 
States have been content to let one dominant 
sea power protect their sea-lanes. But that is 
changing.
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fleet and beachhead. This confusion arose in part because Japanese intelligence 
underestimated the American forces ashore and afloat, and in part because the 
Japanese army and navy underestimated the resolve of American land, air, and 
sea forces, which, after a shaky start, fought well and exhibited a very high degree 
of interservice cooperation. 
Then the reason for Japanese failure became logistical. The decisive American 
campaign advantage was that the United States could reinforce and sustain its 
lodgment with food, fuel, and ammunition because it controlled the air in day-
light hours, while the Japanese were forced to reinforce and support their troops 
only at night. Taking nothing away from the Marines, who had to defeat the 
Japanese army in every battle on the perimeter of Henderson Field, the campaign 
was won by the decisive operational effects of starvation and disease suffered in 
the many Japanese battalions on the island.28
Tension between United Action and Delegated Authority
The ideal in a war is to achieve similar collaboration of all commanders verti-
cally and laterally, so that cohesive action results. It should be easy to understand 
why perfect unity is hard to achieve, because prosecution of a campaign entails 
decentralized authority and responsibility. The art of fencing, or samurai swords-
manship, is a poor analogy for a military operation because swordsmen are in 
sole control of their actions and do not have to cooperate with anybody else. A 
better analogy is football, because it is a team effort in a campaign (the game) 
comprising a series of battles (the plays). 
Evidently the ideal is rarely attained. The best, but imperfect, results come 
from:
• Sound doctrine that fosters operational and tactical unity of action.
• Sound training that prepares all echelons for teamwork. The basis of cohe-
sion is notably unobtainable at high echelons when government officials 
neither know nor care about the intricacies involved in cooperative action 
in a maritime campaign or about the difficulty of retraining to a new opera-
tional objective.
• Sound experience that comes from enough of the right kind of war making 
to know what to expect of companions in positions of authority and respon-
sibility. This is a great limitation when interpersonal experience has been in 
fighting an inapplicable kind of war. 
These three cornerstones of success are preparations at the operational level, not 
the responsibility of tacticians—at least not at sea.
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AMERICAN NAVAL OPERATIONS TODAY AND IN THE FUTURE
This is a static [Roman] world. Civilized life, like the cultivation of Auso-
nius’s magnificent Bordeaux vineyards, lies in doing well what has been 
done before. Doing the expected is the highest value—and the second 




In How the Irish Saved Civilization Thomas Cahill uses the poet Ausonius as a 
foil to show why gentrified Romans could not see that changes all around them 
would soon lead to their empire’s collapse.29 Naval operations are not poetry, 
and American perspectives are far from those of the Roman Empire, but this is 
not a time for U.S. leadership to be admired for doing the expected in planning 
the Navy’s future. The American navy has not been contested at sea since 1945. 
In all subsequent operations—including major conflicts in Korea, Vietnam, and 
Southwest Asia—it has enjoyed the unconstrained benefits of delivering combat 
power from a safe sea sanctuary. With few exceptions, its doctrine, training, and 
preparation for fighting enemy ships in missile combat have had to be based 
vicariously on the experiences of other navies. That probably explains why our 
navy has not recognized the significance of two big transformations.
A tactical transformation was from the carrier era to the missile era of warfare, 
along with two additional complications: the impending influence of robotic 
systems and of cyber operations. The combat effects of missile warfare at sea were 
not crucial until the geopolitical transformation in East Asia, which now impels a 
reconsideration of the American strategy to influence China and our Asian allies 
in the twenty-first century. 
The operational solution to retain strategic influence in the western Pacific 
must reflect China’s growing antiaccess tactics and also anticipate that China, for 
quite logical reasons, will soon construct a sea-control navy of its own. 
The fundamental changes in East Asia are accompanied by U.S. fleet obliga-
tions in many and varying places around the world—first, to fight irregular wars; 
second, to maintain coastal presence for peacemaking; and third, to attain local 
sea control and deliver combat power from the sea. The latter is the U.S. Navy’s 
familiar post–World War II role, of course, in which combat power, manifested 
in ground and air forces, was delivered unfailingly and efficiently at every scene 
of action—and was consistently taken for granted. 
We have emphasized the decisive shift to missile warfare. We have not as yet 
spoken of undersea warfare, which has been neglected in the U.S. Navy for two 
decades. Antisubmarine and mine forces need to concentrate on the difficult 
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waters of the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, the Yellow Sea, and the China 
Sea, where mine, submarine, and antisubmarine operations must be conducted 
amid bottom clutter and surface-craft noise in waters as shallow as thirty fath-
oms. Submarines in greater numbers must burnish old-fashioned skills to sink 
ships of many kinds in deep and shallow seas. A lot of catch-up is needed to 
exploit new technological opportunities in undersea warfare.
The Content of Viable Strategies
Service documents list six “core capabilities” for the U.S. Navy: Forward Pres-
ence, Deterrence, Sea Control, Power Projection, Maritime Security, and Disaster 
Response.30 
When the first four capabilities were first described in the 1970s, our primary 
opponent was well known in the way Wylie prescribes; the national military 
strategy to constrain the Soviet Union was well defined, Navy campaign analyses 
were extensive, and fleet exercises were frequent and generated well documented, 
influential results. Today the desirability of such capabilities is inarguable, but 
the taxonomy is useless as a guide for future fleet configuration. The capabili-
ties are too vague to be tested without specifying locations or enemies, and they 
say nothing about weight of effort—the forces and tactical skills that must be 
devoted to each. To date the list of core capabilities has had no effect whatsoever 
on U.S. fleet composition. It does nothing to help develop an affordable navy to 
support national strategies.
In the twenty-first century the nation will need clearly expressed, testable 
strategies affecting the naval component of American forces. For purposes of 
illustration, I suggest that the following six strategies would adequately describe 
the primary ends and means of a comprehensive national security plan. 
For China. Forces with the power to influence China and our friends in Asia and 
to ensure freedom of the seas for all nations would serve as the means to the 
end of maintaining effective American presence in the western Pacific. Insofar as 
possible, the same forces must be designed to limit any conflict to China’s own 
seas in a way that avoids abrupt escalation into a long, debilitating war.
For Iran. Forces to deter any form of aggression by Iran ought to embody clearly 
the air and missile power needed to wreak destruction on the Iranian economy 
and means of war, as well as the naval power to isolate Iran by winning control of 
the Strait of Hormuz and seas on both ends of it. The forces for such an air-sea 
strategy will probably provide the best affordable means to respond to any other 
state threatening violence, while avoiding a costly war on the ground.
For Irregular Warfare. Forces can be deployed in many distributable packages and 
maintained economically for long-lasting antipiracy, antidrug, and antismuggling 
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operations or to support short, successful operations such as those conducted by 
ground forces in Grenada, Panama, and the first Lebanon crisis. 
For Nuclear War. Navy forces are part of a national capability to deter an attack 
with nuclear weapons by any of a growing number of states that have them. 
Navy SSBNs and ballistic-missile-defense ships should contribute according to 
the provisions of that strategy. In addition, the strategy ought to specify how to 
combat terrorists and nonstate actors—presumably, as in the past, by denial to 
terrorists of weapons of mass destruction insofar as possible.
For Cyberspace. The nature of national cyberspace “forces” is not the only thing 
that makes this strategy different from the others. The White House and Defense 
Department have both issued cyberspace doctrines, which they call “strategies.” 
The former aspires to be international policy, but (despite its title) it is not a 
testable strategy. The latter is probably adequate as a strategy that can serve as the 
basis of campaign planning and testing. For example, it explicitly calls for training 
and experimentation.31 A cyberspace strategy and campaign plans are desirable 
because international, nonlethal cyberwarfare is going on right now. An execut-
able national strategy is desirable because, first, cyberspace operations affect 
daily commercial, social, and government activities; second, cyberwar will play a 
significant role in a shooting war; and third, we have a peacetime opportunity to 
learn more about how electronic “forces” defend our systems and can attack an 
enemy in a fast-changing virtual environment. Yet the capabilities for defending 
and attacking cyber links are different in nature from the more tangible, count-
able objects of the other five strategies. Vice Admiral Arthur W. Cebrowski prob-
ably had such a distinction between links and objects in mind when he espoused 
“network-centric warfare.”32 
For Homeland Defense. Vital, difficult, and expensive though it is to keep home-
land defenses up to date, the strategy ought not to affect U.S. fleet design. There 
are those who think Navy vessels for overseas irregular warfare should contrib-
ute to defending our coasts. Perhaps so, but let the national government first 
design a comprehensive homeland-defense strategy that emphasizes the Coast 
Guard and domestic law-enforcement agencies. Then we can see how an afford-
able Navy might contribute—for example, with collaborative research and the 
development of tools for coastal action.
{LINE-SPACE} 
This is a personal set of strategies to illustrate what is meant by having enough 
content and focus to be translated into executable war plans and tested by cam-
paign (operational-level) analyses: simulations, war games, transparent math-
ematical representations (“models”) of the process, and experiments at sea. It 
may not be the best list. For example, the strategies do not include major ground 
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combat operations like Operations DESERT STORM, ENDURING FREEDOM, or 
IRAQI FREEDOM. Paradoxically, those operations illustrate how planning and 
campaign analysis are done. Because they were tested in real war, they show both 
the rich reward and severe limitations of campaign studies that estimate the 
forces needed, help design the operational scheme, and forecast the casualties and 
time it will cost to execute the plan.33
An Appraisal of Consequences 
Observe that a strategy without testing is merely a desire—a hypothesis. Cam-
paign planning and analysis help find out whether a strategy is viable and 
whether assigned forces are suitable to execute it. It is not our purpose to discuss 
shortcomings in today’s forces. We 
will merely assert that it is possible 
to design a better fleet to fulfill the 
U.S. Navy’s role in the first four 
strategies, and within the current 
shipbuilding budget envelope. We have not especially concerned ourselves herein 
with the budgetary implications of future navy forces—costing is not inherent in 
the planning of current operations. But it takes only a quick reminder of coming 
national financial pressures to observe that future defense strategies must adapt 
to the nation’s means to pay for them.
Observe, next, that each of the six is a national strategy. Though our emphasis 
here is on maritime activities, the Navy can neither express a strategy as policy 
nor implement it alone. Still, that is no reason why it should not be aggressive 
in describing the strategies and helping to test them for executability. The U.S. 
Navy can—indeed, it must—anticipate each strategy and build forces that serve 
as long-lived means to support it.
Observe that to be effective the strategies must be unclassified and widely 
read—by opponents, so they understand their feasibility and potential impact; by 
international friends, so they know our faithfulness and desire for collaboration; 
and by American policy makers, to engender unity of purpose. An advantage of 
distinguishing three levels of war is in separating a strategy that can (and must) 
be widely disseminated from the often-secret operational plans and actions 
needed to execute it.
Observe that the unified combatant commands cannot determine strategies 
even for their own theaters. A theater commander’s task is to develop operational 
plans with the forces assigned. For influencing China, U.S. Pacific Command is 
the focus, and its commander will naturally work with the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
to develop and test effective operations in peace and war, with emphasis on 
maintaining long-term American influence in East Asia. In executing his peace-
time responsibilities, the Pacific combatant commander will also anticipate and 
In the twenty-first century the nation will need 
clearly expressed, testable strategies affecting 
the naval component of American forces.
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describe combat capabilities better suited for the future, presumably in the form 
of more distributed and more survivable surface ships, submarines, aircraft, and 
ISR elements.
The fleet intended to influence China must be capable of serving many and 
varying American policies, from cooperation to competition, confrontation, or 
conflict. Yet its ships and aircraft must be constructed with thirty- and forty-
year lifetimes. Even the simplest policies of cooperation applied to the People’s 
Republic of China and the Republic of China have been deliciously multifaceted 
in the ways they have been executed by past American presidents and the De-
partment of State. Their strategic thinking comprises wheels within wheels of 
subtlety. Cooperation implies port visits, joint exercises, humanitarian assistance, 
and other ways of signaling friendship. But in prior manifestations the Navy 
has also been employed as a tool to send confrontational signals with warships. 
Moreover, every American policy variant must be prepared to react to Chinese 
initiatives with a single, robust fleet composition.
Observe that each strategy must be designed so that most nations welcome, 
or even insist on, American action. This is not as difficult as it may seem, if one 
structures each strategy with that in mind. Twenty-first-century American strate-
gies should include collaborators, reflecting that felicitous term, now out of favor, 
“a thousand-ship [international] navy.”
Observe the issue of pace in the first four strategies. American navy planning 
during the Cold War placed the fleet forward in substantial numbers, because 
a Soviet attack would demand an instant NATO response before escalation to 
nuclear war. By contrast, exploration of deployments today is likely to show that 
for each of those four strategies a modest peacekeeping force at the scene is more 
desirable, if it can be followed by a formidable air and sea buildup. Our national 
strategies should be designed to signal substantively—as distinct from the mere 
use of threatening words—in time of crisis that the United States, backed by 
world opinion, intends to act forcefully. To some readers this will be a jarring 
point of view, because it has not been practiced by the U.S. Navy since before 
World War II, but it has advantages in both campaign flexibility and affordability. 
Patience is usually a greater virtue than immediate response when preparing to 
apply overwhelming force.
THE UNIFYING ROLE OF OPERATIONAL ART 
The operational level of war at sea introduced as doctrine in 1994 by the Com-
mandant of the Marine Corps and the Chief of Naval Operations is useful. It 
promotes congruence between campaign planning and execution. It heightens 
awareness of operational logistics. It clarifies the roles of theater commanders. 
It disciplines policy and strategy, by showing that until a strategy is tested by 
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campaign analysis and fleet exercises it is only a hypothesis and a desire. It coun-
tenances open publication of a strategy, while leaving room to develop secret 
operational plans for its execution.
We have seen that a useful way to appreciate how naval operations differ from 
strategy and tactics is to describe their distinguishing constants, trends, and 
variables. We have observed that the conduct of a successful maritime campaign 
falls outside the explanatory three levels of warfare but instead must be an artful, 
integrated web of decisions and actions. 
At the tactical level, future plans must recognize the impending influence of 
robots and cyber operations in the missile age of warfare. We have inferred that 
these changes will lead to a more distributable fighting force of scouts, subma-
rines, ships, and aircraft configured for mutual support and survival. The future 
fleet must be capable of safeguarding the movement of worldwide commercial 
shipping and of achieving command of any sea—eventually. Smaller, offensively 
potent elements that will probably constitute the next battle fleet may also serve 
as “cruisers” and part of “the flotilla.” We will not know until our strategic aims 
are clearly stated and the fleet is designed. Then campaign analysis will be able 
to test the tactical employment as well as the operational deployment of future 
naval forces.
Some strategists and policy makers may wish to arrange the six strategies in 
a grand mosaic. For example, a strategy against terrorists sometimes heard is 
“homeland defense, overseas offense.” A comprehensive antiterrorist strategy 
will embrace components of irregular warfare, cyber operations, and homeland 
defense. There is nothing wrong with this ultimate goal, but our purpose here is 
not to arrive at a comprehensive strategy. Our purpose has been to illustrate the 
vital role of operational art in testing every strategy. 
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